Inaugural Lecture: Berislav Marušić

The Ethicist and the Ontologist: On Self-Prediction in Practical Reasoning

Sometimes there is something problematic about self-prediction in practical reasoning. For example, the smoker who reasons that, since they are likely to smoke in the future, they should not take steps to quit as they are likely a wasted effort, is making a mistake. But what sort of mistake is it? The Ethicist holds that the mistake is fundamentally ethical: it’s an objectionable opportunism that excuses the satisfaction of a questionable preference. Thus, the smoker who refuses to quit on the grounds that he is likely to smoke again is finding an excuse for his bad habit. The Ontologist holds that the mistake is fundamentally ontological: it’s a mistake about the nature of freedom. Thus, the smoker who refuses to quit on the grounds that he is likely to smoke again treats his smoking as something that is not up to him but as a mere outcome, like the drawing of a lottery.

In this paper, I examine the depth of the disagreement between the Ethicist and the Ontologist. I argue that, despite various arguments against the opposing position, they are not fundamentally inconsistent. My main thesis is that mistakes about freedom are mistakes of freedom: An ontological mistake about our freedom is an ethically mistaken instance of choice. This is why, despite differences in emphasis, the Ethicist and the Ontologist can be reconciled.